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Boundedly Rational Borrowing
Cass R. Sunsteint
Excessive borrowing, no less than insufficient savings, might be a product of bounded ra-
tionality. Identifiable psychological mechanisms are likely to contribute to excessive borrowing;
these include myopia, procrastination, optimism bias, "miswanting," and what might be called
cumulative cost neglect. Suppose that excessive borrowing is a significant problem for some or
many; if so, how might the law respond? The first option involves weak paternalis m, through debi-
asing and other strategies that leave people free to choose as they wish. Another option is strong
paternalism, which forecloses choice. Because of private heterogeneity and the risk of government
error, regulators should have a firm presumption against strong paternalism, and hence the initial
line of defense against excessive borrowing consists of information campaigns, debiasing, and
default rules. On imaginable empirical findings, however, there may be a plausible argument for
strong paternalism in the form of restrictions on various practices, perhaps including "teaser rates"
and late fees The two larger themes applicable in many contexts, involve the importance of an ex
post perspective on the consequences of consumer choices and the virtues and limits of weak forms
of paternalism, including debiasing and libertarian paternalism.
I. THREE KINDS OF PEOPLE
The world contains three kinds of people: those who borrow the
right amount, those who borrow too much, and those who borrow too
little.
The evaluation of whether borrowing is optimal might be made
ex ante or ex post. Economists and economically oriented lawyers pre-
fer the ex ante perspective. From that perspective, people might bor-
row too little if they lack adequate information about the high bene-
fits or low costs of borrowing in a particular instance. Or they might
borrow too little if some kind of emotion-unjustified fear of debt, for
example -disables them from borrowing money in circumstances in
which they would do so if not thus disabled. Excessive borrowing
could have a similar ex ante explanation. Borrowers might be insuffi-
ciently informed of the costs of credit, believing that those costs are
far lower than they actually are. Alternatively, borrowers might suffer
from a cognitive or motivational problem, such as impulsiveness, that
leads them to borrow, and perhaps to face high interest rates, when
fully rational people would not do so.
At least as plausibly, the question of optimal borrowing should be
investigated ex post, with close reference to the actual effects of bor-
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rowing behavior on people's lives. If we are concerned about human
welfare, there is much to be said in favor of the ex post perspective.
Sometimes there is a gap between what people want and what people
like; if so, the wanting-liking gap might be large enough to justify gov-
ernmental concern. A central question is the effects of consumer
choices, including borrowing, on consumers. We might find that insuf-
ficient or excessive borrowing ensures that people's lives go signifi-
cantly less well than they otherwise would.
Suppose, for example, that people's consumption choices lead
them to purchase products that do not much improve their well-being,
but that the resulting debt much impairs their well-being-by, for ex-
ample, making current earnings go to debt repayment rather than
food and medical care. Or perhaps consumer behavior leads to a bat-
tle for greater relative position, one that amounts to a kind of arms
race in which people try to keep pace with one another That arms
race, involving competition over "positional goods," almost certainly
plays a role in recent increases in consumer debt. If borrowing means
that people's welfare is significantly reduced, then there is a real prob-
lem, one that might justify some kind of legal intervention.
The risk of excessive borrowing is paralleled by the risk of insuf-
ficient borrowing. Perhaps people's lives would go better if they were
willing to incur debt at various stages. Perhaps many young people,
and some older ones too, are unduly fearful of debt, and hence refuse
to borrow money when it is very much in their interest to do so. It is
fully imaginable that the problem of excessive borrowing is equaled or
exceeded by the problem of insufficient borrowing.
I do not seek in this Essay to reach any final conclusions about
the sources and magnitude of boundedly rational borrowing or about
the appropriate legal response. My narrower goal is to provide a kind
of regulator's guide, or a conceptual map-a general outline of the
reasons that boundedly rational borrowing might occur and the possi-
ble legal remedies. My hope is that the discussion will be applicable to
a wide range of situations in which bounded rationality is a potential
problem; hence, much of the analysis could be applied to such behav-
ior as smoking, drinking, eating, exercising, saving, vacationing, and
working. Evaluation of the relevant mechanisms and remedies would
require detailed empirical investigation, which I do not venture here.
I See Colin Camerer, Wanting, Liking, and Learning: Neuroscience and Paternalism, 73 U
Chi L Rev 87,101-06 (2006).
2 See Robert H. Frank, Luxury Fever: Why Money Fails to Satisfy in an Era of Excess 11
(Free 1999) ("In short, both the things we feel we need and the things available for us to buy
depend largely-beyond some point, almost entirely-on the things that others choose to buy.").
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There are two larger themes. The first, already suggested, involves
the importance of evaluating the effects of consumer behavior ex post
rather than ex ante-of investigating the consequences of consumer
choices for the lives of consumers. Too often, the ex ante perspective
has ruled that evaluation off limits. The second involves the uses and
limits of weak paternalism. It is possible to imagine approaches to
boundedly rational behavior that preserve freedom of choice while
also steering people in directions that will promote their own well-
being. As a presumption, regulators should favor weak rather than
strong paternalism, simply because the preservation of choice is an
important safeguard against government error.
II. MECHANISMS
My focus here will be on excessive borrowing. A key question is
why people might be excessive rather than optimal borrowers. The
most obvious reason, suggested above, involves a lack of information:
borrowers might not be adequately informed of the costs and benefits
of borrowing. They might not read the fine print; they might believe
that short-term "teaser rates" are actually long-term, or at least ne-
glect the fact that such rates will have only a small beneficial effect on
their finances. To suggest this possibility, it is not necessary to observe
that human beings are boundedly rational. But now assume that we
are dealing with homo sapiens, not homo economicus.' Five problems
are likely to contribute to excessive borrowing.
1) Cumulative cost neglect. Even if boundedly rational, consumers
might well hesitate before borrowing $20,000 at a high rate of interest.
But if a long series of much smaller purchases has that same effect, the
cost might well be less visible. A distinctive form of bounded rational-
ity stems from neglect of the aggregate effect of large numbers of rela-
tively small borrowing choices. Call this "cumulative cost neglect."'
When borrowing is excessive, the reason often lies in that form of ne-
glect. Addictive behavior is the most serious problem here, but cumu-
lative cost neglect can be a problem even without addiction.
2) Procrastination and inertia. For many borrowers, it is not diffi-
cult to avoid high interest rates and late charges. Timely payments will
3 An excellent discussion, from which I have learned a great deal, is Oren Bar-Gill, Seduc-
tion by Plastic, 98 Nw U L Rev 1373 (2004) (explaining today's staggering levels of credit card
debt with a behavioral theory based on consumer biases).
4 See Paul Slovic, What Does It Mean to Know a Cumulative Risk? Adolescents' Percep-
tions of Short-term and Long-term Consequences of Smoking, 13 J Behav Dec Making 259, 261(2000) (finding that although teens understood the long-term implications of smoking, they
underappreciated the risk of each individual cigarette); Paul Slovic, Do Adolescent Smokers
Know the Risks?, 47 Duke L J 1133,1137-38 (1998).
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eliminate the problem. But some borrowers procrastinate, ensuring
that some bills are paid late. As a result, significant charges can accu-
mulate. It is apparently difficult for some people to overcome the
costs of inertia even when transaction costs are minuscule; I speculate
that the economic level of late fees is, in nontrivial part, a result of
procrastination.
3) Unrealistic optimism. Some borrowers suffer from excessive op-
timism,5 believing that they will be able to repay a debt when this is
unlikely. Unrealistically optimistic borrowers will make welfare-
reducing consumption choices, simply because they will fail to appreci-
ate the problems associated with their borrowing. Most young smokers
falsely believe that they will not be smoking in a few years.6 So too,
many borrowers, I suggest, falsely believe that they will not have a seri-
ous debt problem as a result of their behavior. Unrealistic optimism
affects consumers at the time when they are making large expenditures.
It also interacts with cumulative cost neglect.
4) Myopia and self-control problems. Some borrowers are my-
opic, emphasizing the short term at the expense of the future.7 Myopic
borrowing might be seen as a taste for current well-being over future
well-being, in a way that raises no concerns about bounded rationality;
but if a day's welfare produces long-term distress, bounded rationality
is probably involved. Myopia contributes to self-control problems, by
which consumers make decisions that undermine their well-being over
time. In this way, excessive borrowing belongs not only in the same
general family with insufficient savings, but also with insufficient exer-
cise, obesity, poor diet, and excessive smoking and drinking."
5 See David A. Armor and Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of
Unrealistic Optimism, in Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, eds, Heuristics
and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 334,334 (Cambridge 2002) (discussing a human
bias in assuming the best outcomes, particularly in situations with great uncertainty or tempo-
rally distant solutions).
6 See Slovic, 13 J Behav Dec Making at 259 (cited in note 4) (noting that .young smokers
tend to underestimate the risk of becoming addicted to tobacco); Slovic, 47 Duke L J at 1140
(cited in note 4) (discussing a longitudinal study finding that although 32 percent of high school
seniors who smoked one or more packs a day predicted they would not be smoking in five years,
only 13 percent had actually quit smoking five to six years later).
7 See George Loewenstein and Dra~en Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence
and Interpretation, in Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, eds, Choices, Values, and Frames 578,
592-93 (Cambridge 2000) (noting that consumers greatly discount smaller long-term costs).
8 Some problems generally assessed under the rubric of myopia and self-control problems
might wen be better handled under the framework presented in George Loewenstein and Ted
O'Donoghue, "We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way": Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation
and the Law, 73 U Chi L Rev 183, 186-87 (2006). In particular, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue's
emphasis on the role of emotions and temptation has obvious applications to borrowing behavior
as well as to the more familiar contexts of overeating, drinking, and smoking.
[73:249
Boundedly Rational Borrowing
5) Miswanting and relative position. Most generally, some con-
sumers suffer from a problem of "miswanting";' they want (and buy)
things that do not promote their welfare, and they do not want things
that would promote their welfare. When this is so, then the idea of
consumer sovereignty loses some of its underlying justification; peo-
ple's decisions do not actually make their lives go better.' Some bor-
rowing behavior is undoubtedly a product of miswanting. A related
problem arises when borrowing is a product of competition to achieve
better relative position with respect to goods-a competition from
which consumers do not benefit as a whole." When individual con-
sumers are participating in a competition for better relative position,
they are acting rationally, and they are not miswanting: if relative posi-
tion matters-and it does-then people should try to maintain it. But
to the extent that easy borrowing accelerates that competition, it is
likely to produce a great deal of harm.
We do not know whether for society as a whole borrowing is
more properly described as insufficient or as excessive. Even for par-
ticular people, it is difficult to know whether a particular level of bor-
rowing is optimal. And for behavior that unambiguously qualifies as
excessive, it is hard to uncover the role of each of these variables. At
least in theory, however, these forms of bounded rationality are likely
to produce significant problems for some consumers. Optimistic ob-
servers might well contend that borrowing is generally rational, and
perhaps they are right. But the fact that the average American house-
hold has an average credit card debt of $6,500 is at least suggestive,'2
and no one doubts that credit card debt is closely associated with
bankruptcy filings by consumers.3 More generally, a great deal of evi-
dence about the credit card market throws the optimistic view into
some doubt.
9 On "miswanting," see Daniel T. Gilbert and Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some Prob-
lems in the Forecasting of Future Affective States, in Joseph P. Forgas, ed, Feeling and Thinking:
The Role of Affect in Social Cognition 178, 179 (Cambridge 2000) (defining "miswanting" as
wanting something that does not improve one's happiness). See also generally Timothy D. Wilson
and Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, in Mark P. Zanna, ed, 35 Advances in Exp Soc Psych
345 (Academic 2003) (analyzing people's inability to predict their own feelings).
10 Daniel Kahneman, Peter P. Wakker, and Rakesh Sarin, Back to Bentham? Explorations
of Experienced Utility, 112 Q J Econ 375, 379-88 (1997) (distinguishing between "experienced
utility" and "decision utility").
11 See Frank, Luxury Fever at 9 (cited in note 2) (arguing that eliminating competitive spend-
ing would make people better off because it would allow resources to be spent in other ways).
12 Bar-Gill, 98 Nw U L Rev at 1385 (cited in note 3).
13 See id at 1385-86 (discussing empirical studies indicating a causal relationship between
credit card debt and consumer bankruptcy filings).
14 See generally id.
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It is certainly plausible to distinguish between excessive and op-
timal borrowing. It is even plausible to suggest that market pressures
will lead companies to appeal to the human tendency, grounded in the
factors just outlined, to borrow excessively.'5 Suppose, purely for pur-
poses of argument, that excessive borrowing occurs at a significant
rate, and that it causes individual and social harm. What is the appro-
priate solution? Is there anything that law might do to help?
III. WEAK PATERNALISM
Let us begin by distinguishing between strong and weak paternal-
ism. As I understand it here, strong paternalism forecloses choice,
typically on the ground that all or most people will choose unwisely.
Mandatory seat belt laws and bans on the use of cocaine and heroin
can be understood as strongly paternalistic (though third-party effects
are relevant as well). In the context of excessive borrowing, an appre-
ciation of bounded rationality might well spur proposals for strong
paternalism, on the theory that people will make choices that under-
mine their own well-being.'6 If borrowing is likely to be boundedly
rational, some such proposals might seem to make a great deal of
sense on certain empirical assumptions.
A. Against Strong Paternalism
In general, there are three problems with such proposals. The first
involves individual heterogeneity. Even if many borrowers suffer from
bounded rationality, others do not; and it is unfortunate if government
is punishing the latter group to help the former. Indeed, any govern-
mental help for those who are boundedly rational may remove a de-
sirable incentive to learn over time.
In addition, what seems to be bounded rationality may simply in-
volve idiosyncratic tastes. If some people are eating a great deal of ice
cream, and gaining a lot of weight as a result, this may be because they
greatly enjoy ice cream. No problem of bounded rationality need be
involved. If some people are refusing to exercise, it may be because
they really dislike exercise and because the health gains from exercise,
even over a lifetime, do not justify the costs. Some apparently exces-
sive borrowers may know that they will be able to pay back their loans
15 See, for example, id at 1434 (arguing that "highly sophisticated corporations will often
exploit consumers' behavioral biases").
16 See, for example, id at 1421 ("[I]t may be desirable to categorically prohibit the use of
penalties, negative amortization rates, and even some types of teaser rates in unsolicited offers.").
17 See id at 1417 (noting that "the implementation costs of ... different policy proposals
must be weighed against the potential benefits from these proposals").
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as a result of growing income in future years; for them, it is worthwhile
to pay high interest rates now in return for the option to consume a
great deal immediately. Perhaps they are borrowing in order to pro-
vide good opportunities for their young children; perhaps they will be
in a better position to eliminate their debt when their children are
older. Perhaps they are borrowing in the reasonable expectation that
their earnings will increase in the future, when they will have less time
to enjoy themselves.
The second problem involves the risk of government error. No
less than ordinary people, government officials are subject to various
forms of bounded rationality, including myopia, cumulative cost ne-
glect, and unrealistic optimism." Worse still, public officials are subject
to parochial pressures, including interest group power, that can greatly
distort their judgments. A government that indulges in strong pater-
nalism might make erroneous decisions as a result of its own blunders
and the efforts of groups with a strong stake in the outcome. In the
domain of borrowing behavior, it is easy to imagine apparently public-
interested restrictions that are actually an effort to promote the inter-
ests of well-organized private groups. It is even plausible to suggest
that an appreciation of behavioral issues raises more, rather than fewer,
concerns about the risk of government error, simply because officials
are human beings too.
The third problem has to do with the corrective potential of indi-
vidual choice. If government allows people to opt out of its preferred
arrangement, it will create an immediate safeguard. That safeguard
can protect against government error and work to protect against one-
size-fits-all solutions. It also ensures that if circumstances change over
time, and if markets and individual initiative create novel opportuni-
ties and arrangements, people can take advantage of them. In the con-
text of borrowing, markets are rapidly changing, " and strong paternal-
ism might be responding to a problem that is diminishing. One of the
advantages of weak paternalism is that it may be technology-forcing,
in the sense that it can spur innovations that respond to individual
needs in ways that government may be unable to imagine. Because
strong paternalism forbids private choice, it may freeze a solution that,
at best, works for most rather than all, and that might cease to work
for most as time passes.
18 See the discussion of "behavioral bureaucrats" in Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and
Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471, 1543-45
(1998).
19 See Tom Brown and Lacey Plache, Paying with Plastic: Maybe Not So Crazy, 73 U Chi L
Rev 63, 67-74 (2006) (discussing the development of the consumer credit market).
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B. Paternalism with Liberty
For all of these reasons, there should be a firm presumption against
strong paternalism. And in fact a great deal of recent attention has been
focused on forms of paternalism that steer boundedly rational people
in directions that will promote their own well-being. Three ideas have
received particular attention.
1. Asymmetrical paternalism.
Colin Camerer and his coauthors have argued in favor of "asym-
metrical paternalism," in the form of interventions that promise to
deliver significant benefits to those who do suffer from bounded ra-
tionality, without imposing significant costs on those who do not so
suffer.2 A core example is a "cooling off" period. A waiting period for
certain decisions can protect people facing self-control problems
without much harming people who do not face those problems. If
people are asked to wait for a certain period before buying encyclo-
pedias, getting married, or becoming divorced, many may be helped
while few will be hurt, and those who are hurt are unlikely to be hurt
much. So too with information disclosure, which should protect those
who suffer from certain cognitive biases without injuring consumers
who do not need any such information. The central goal of asymmetri-
cal paternalism is to develop modest initiatives that serve to correct
individual errors without adversely affecting those who do not err.
2. Libertarian paternalism.
It is also possible to imagine "libertarian paternalism," in the
form of approaches that steer people in welfare-promoting directions
while also allowing them to do as they wish." An approach is both lib-
ertarian and paternalistic if it retains freedom of choice while also
leading people to make decisions that will improve their well-being.
Defining examples are private and public default rules, based on a
sensible view about the proper course of action; consider automatic
enrollment plans for savings, which lead to dramatic increases in sav-
ings rates.' Or consider the Save More Tomorrow (SMarT) plan, by
20 See generally Colin Camerer, et al, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics
and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U Pa L Rev 1211 (2003).
21 See generally Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U Chi L Rev 1159 (2003).
22 See James J. Choi, et al, Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Choices,
and the Path of Least Resistance, in James M. Poterba, ed, 16 Tax Policy and the Economy 67,70
(MIT 2002) ("[A]utomatic enrollment in a 401(k) plan dramatically raises participation rates.");
Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis F Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation
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which some employers have provided their employees with a novel
option: allocate a portion of future wage increases to savings. Employ-
ees who choose this plan are free to opt out at any time. A large num-
ber of employees have agreed to try the plan, and only a few have
opted out. The result has been significant increases in savings rates. '
There is a large overlap between asymmetrical paternalism and
libertarian paternalism. The reason is that interventions that are
choice-preserving (and hence libertarian) are generally asymmetrical,
because they are not likely to impose significant costs on people who
do not suffer from bounded rationality. But the two concepts are not
the same. It is possible to imagine a form of paternalism that is liber-
tarian but not asymmetrical-as, for example, in a default rule that
does not help people who are boundedly rational, but that leads to an
outcome that would protect some segment of the population. (A de-
fault rule in which zero percent of wages go to savings certainly quali-
fies as libertarian, and it steers employees in a particular direction, but
it cannot qualify as a form of asymmetrical paternalism.) We could
also imagine a form of asymmetrical paternalism that denies choice
and hence does not count as libertarian; consider a ban on certain pur-
chases that are almost never made by people who do not suffer from
bounded rationality.
3. Debiasing through law.
Under a third approach, weak paternalists might seek to "debias"
people through law,24 by taking advantage of empirical work on strate-
gies operating to debias people from the effects of bounded rational-
ity." Consider an approach that attempts to respond to unrealistic op-
timism on the part of consumers by harnessing the availability heuris-
and Savings Behavior, 116 Q J Econ 1149, 1149-50 (2001) (noting that a switch from elective
enrollment in a 401(k) plan to automatic enrollment "dramatically changed the savings behavior
of employees").
23 See Richard H. Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral
Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J Polit Econ S164, S170-79 (2004).
24 See Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J Legal Stud
(forthcoming 2006).
25 See, for example, Neil D. Weinstein and William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk
Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions, in Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, eds, Heuristics and
Biases 313 (cited in note 5) (presenting four empirical studies on the viability of debiasing);
Lawrence J. Sanna, Norbert Schwarz, and Shevaun L. Stocker, When Debiasing Backfires:Acces-
sible Content and Accessibility Experiences in Debiasing Hindsight, 28 J Exp Psych: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition 497 (2002) (discussing two experiments evaluating attempts to counter-
act the hindsight bias); Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos
Tversky, eds, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 422 (Cambridge 1982) (review-
ing debiasing studies attempting to limit the effect of various biases).
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tic." With such strategies, excessive optimism is met by vivid narratives
of possible harm, in a way that is meant to give people a more realistic
appreciation of the risks at stake.7 Debiasing strategies are the weak-
est form of weak paternalism; the relevant steering operates directly
on bounded rationality and allows people to act as they see fit. When
debiasing strategies are used, consumers and others remain entirely
free to choose.
4. Objections to weak paternalism.
It is tempting to object to weak paternalism on the ground that
even if it is weak, paternalism involves a form of governmental ma-
nipulation of consumers, in a way that might violate their autonomy
and produce welfare losses as well." Slippery slope problems might
also seem especially severe in this domain. Suppose that government
believes itself entitled to debias and that officials and relevant groups
know exactly how to accomplish that task. If so, regulators might well
be tempted to engage in a form of "mind control," steering both pref-
erences and choices in their preferred directions. As the history of
government propaganda suggests, there can be no assurance that any
debiasing will be exercised benignly. And if regulators and their allies
know about the power of default rules, perhaps they will default peo-
ple into options that serve parochial interests rather than the interests
of those who are supposed to be benefited. It is easy to imagine, for
example, that groups with a financial interest in increased savings
might favor approaches that increase savings, whatever the welfare
effects on workers. It is also possible to imagine interest group ma-
neuvering that would protect certain kinds of lenders at the expense
of others.
The simplest response to this objection is that some forms of
weak paternalism are unavoidable. In many cases, weak paternalism,
in the form of government steering, is inevitable, and it is utterly
pointless to ask whether such steering is desirable.' 9 For example, any
legal system must rely on default rules; "every policy must have a no-
action default, and defaults impose physical, cognitive, and ... emo-
26 See Jolls and Sunstein, 35 J Legal Stud (forthcoming 2006) (cited in note 24).
27 See Frank A. Sloan, V. Kerry Smith, and Donald H. Taylor, Jr., The Smoking Puzzle:
Information, Risk Perception, and Choice 122-23,127,161,180--81 (Harvard 2003) (discussing the
effect of information about the health harms of smoking on perceptions of the risks of smoking).
28 See Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U Chi L Rev 133,149-56 (2006).
29 See Sunstein and Thaler, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1174-75, 1182-83 (cited in note 21) (discussing
the coercive effects of various legal arrangements to demonstrate the inevitability of paternalism).
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tional costs on those who must change their status."'' Default rules
specify, among other things, what happens when parties have not
agreed on the time of performance, or when employers and employees
have not specified whether employment is at will or for cause, or
whether employees are entitled to vacation time and to be free from
discrimination on the basis of age. In the world of borrowing, no less
than in the world of employment, default terms are pervasive; they
identify the background for bargaining by saying who must obtain
what sort of agreement from whom. This background inevitably af-
fects preferences and choices. This is the sense in which government
steering, and in that sense weak paternalism, is unavoidable.
Those who object to weak paternalism sometimes speak as if
government can be absent -as if the default terms that set the back-
ground come from nature or from the sky. This is a major confusion.
To be sure, it is possible that the default terms that now apply in any
particular context are generally best, in the sense that they promote
the interests of the parties on net. But that view must be defended, not
asserted. The central point is that whether or not the default terms are
desirable, they help to shape preferences and choices, and in that sense
reflect a form of weak paternalism.
Perhaps the committed antipaternalist could acknowledge this
point and argue, more cautiously, that there should be a strong pre-
sumption against weak paternalism except to the extent that it is in-
evitable. And it is true that many forms of weak paternalism are far
from inevitable. Regulators may or may not choose information cam-
paigns, cooling off periods, and debiasing strategies. Should there be a
presumption against those admittedly optional approaches? This ques-
tion is hard to answer in the abstract. Suppose we believe that most of
the time, boundedly rational behavior is not likely to be terribly dam-
aging and that market forces, together with social influences and pri-
vate learning, will provide a corrective. Suppose we believe that regu-
lators are highly likely to be confused or self-serving, and that their
apparent efforts to correct bounded rationality will usually do more
harm than good, even if the efforts at correction involve weak paternal-
ism. If so, a presumption against weak paternalism would be justified.
30 Eric J. Johnson and Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 Science 1338, 1339
(2003) (discussing how a default in favor of organ donation will lead to greater participation as
people make a choice they may not otherwise go out of their way to make). Two qualifications
are necessary here. First, it is possible to follow an approach of "coerced choosing," by which no
default rule is in place and people are forced to select a rule or policy. In many cases, however,
coerced choosing is not feasible, and in many others it is not desirable. Second, the ellipses elimi-
nate the words "in the case of [organ] donation," where the emotional costs may be especially
high; but emotional costs often attach to changes in default rules.
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Nothing said here rules that presumption out of bounds. On
imaginable empirical assumptions, it makes a great deal of sense. A
recognition of bounded rationality does not by itself justify any par-
ticular form of governmental response; cognitive error on the private
end might be matched or even exceeded by cognitive (and other) fail-
ure by public institutions. Perhaps this is so of boundedly rational bor-
rowing; recall that I have not attempted to show that the problem of
excessive borrowing is serious enough to justify a governmental re-
sponse of any kind. But it is also plausible to think that in many con-
texts, bounded rationality causes significant harm, that the market
does not provide an adequate corrective, and that modest regulatory
interventions can make people much better off. Let us shift, then, from
more general questions to some concrete possibilities.
IV. RESPONSES TO BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL BORROWING
Those inclined to weak paternalism might consider three ap-
proaches to excessive borrowing.
A. Information
The first response would be purely informational-the kind of
approach taken by the Truth in Lending Act." Here the goal would be
to ensure that borrowers know what they are doing. If important facts
seem hidden, buried in fine print, or unintelligible, regulators might
take corrective steps. The most obvious example is to require clear
disclosure of interest rates. Suppose market and regulatory pressures
now work well, so that consumers generally know about rates and so
that competition is actively working to lower rates." If so, perhaps it is
time to consider informational approaches for late fees, a significant
source of revenue and perhaps a product of bounded rationality for
many consumers. Whatever the target of disclosure, the advantage of
this approach is that it is unlikely to impose any real costs on those
who seek to borrow, while at the same time producing real benefits to
those who might borrow excessively.
There are, however, serious problems with informational ap-
proaches. Most fundamentally, they do not adequately come to terms
with bounded rationality. If borrowers are both myopic and exces-
sively optimistic, there is a serious risk that purely informational re-
31 15 USC § 1601 et seq (2000 & Supp 2002).
32 See Brown and Plache, 73 U Chi L Rev at 79 (cited in note 19).
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sponses will do little or nothing.33 If consumers are suffering from cu-
mulative cost neglect, then most disclosure strategies will not work-
unless, perhaps, they explicitly focus people on cumulative costs, in
which case disclosure is sliding into a form of debiasing. The general
lesson is that the strategy of "provide more information," favored on
standard economic grounds, should be helpful when people merely
lack knowledge; but as a response to biases and self-control problems,
it is most likely to be inadequate.
In fact the problem is worse still. When government attempts to
"provide more information," it has to engage in some kind of framing.
Because of bounded rationality, some frames will have more of an
impact than others. For those who suffer from serious forms of bounded
rationality, steps like those in the Truth in Lending Act may well do lit-
tle good. Of course the key questions here are empirical ones; it would
be extremely valuable to have a sense of the effects of the Truth in
Lending Act. It is possible that the effects are small. Perhaps more
self-conscious efforts to inform consumers would have desirable ef-
fects. But unless the problem really is a simple lack of information,
there is little reason for much confidence on that count.
B. Debiasing
A second possibility would involve debiasing. Here government
would be highly alert to the psychological mechanisms that create a
risk of excessive borrowing, and it would take steps specifically de-
signed to counteract those risks. Consider the parallel domain of
smoking behavior, where a great deal of work has been devoted to
debiasing.7 Of course the argument for debiasing is far stronger for
smoking; borrowing is most unlikely to kill people. But for those who
borrow excessively, the underlying mechanisms are not unrelated to
those that account for excessive smoking." Optimism bias, cumulative
cost neglect, and myopia play a role in both settings. It might therefore
be productive to use the "smoking model" far more generally, drawing
on that model in any effort to develop debiasing strategies to combat
the risk of excessive borrowing.
33 See Bar-Gill, 98 Nw U L Rev at 1417-20 (cited in note 3) (discussing the Truth in Lending
Act and noting that impersonal disclosures of statistical information may not overcome consumers'
cognitive biases).
34 See, for example, Sloan, Smith, and Taylor, The Smoking Puzzle at 122-23, 127, 161
(cited in note 27) (evaluating the effectiveness of debiasing efforts on people's perceptions of the
risks of smoking).
35 An obvious exception is that smoking can be physically addictive; for most excessive
borrowers, the idea of addiction is only a metaphor.
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An obvious approach would enlist salience and availability in the
debiasing effort. It is well-established that in thinking about risks, peo-
ple rely on certain heuristics, or rules of thumb, which serve to simplify
their inquiry 6 Heuristics typically work through a process of "attrib-
ute substitution," in which people answer a hard question by substitut-
ing an easier one.7 When people use the availability heuristic, they
assess the magnitude of risks by asking whether examples can readily
come to mind.) If people can easily think of such examples, they are
far more likely to be affected than if they cannot. For example, "a class
whose instances are easily retrieved will appear more numerous than
a class of equal frequency whose instances are less retrievable., 39
This is a point about how familiarity can affect the availability of
instances. A risk that is familiar, like those associated with guns, will be
seen as more serious than a risk that is less familiar, like those associ-
ated with sunbathing.4' But salience is important as well. "For example,
the impact of seeing a house burning on the subjective probability of
such accidents is probably greater than the impact of reading about a
fire in the local paper.'" Salience is highly related to vividness. A vivid
example often does much more than statistical information in ensur-
ing that people attend to potential risks.2
How might these points be used in a debiasing campaign to coun-
teract excessive borrowing? We could imagine three possibilities. First,
and best of all, credit card companies might attempt on their own to
debias the most vulnerable borrowers, without any kind of govern-
36 See generally Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, Judgment under Uncertainty (cited in note
25) (offering a collection of works that discuss the presence of heuristics and biases in the daily
lives of average individuals).
37 See Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, eds, Heuristics and Biases
49, 53 (cited in note 5) (defining attribute substitution as the process by which "an individual
assesses a specified target attribute of a judgment object by substituting another property of that
object-the heuristic attribute-which comes more readily to mind").
38 See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman,Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
in Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, eds, Judgment under Uncertainty 3,11-14 (cited in note 25).
39 Id at 11 (discussing a study in which subjects who were provided with a list of famous
men and women erroneously judged that the list contained more women than men when the
women on the list were relatively more famous).
40 See Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Ex-
plores the Hidden Side of Everything 150-52 (Morrow 2005) (arguing that an individual's percep-
tion of risk can be affected by the imminence of the harm and the extent to which it is outra-
geous or dramatic).
41 Tversky and Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty, in Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky,
eds, Judgment under Uncertainty at 11 (cited in note 25).
42 See Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of
Social Judgment 43-53 (Prentice-Hall 1980) (noting that information is more vivid when it has
emotional interest, is concrete, and has greater proximity; and arguing that vivid information
impacts later inferences because it is more memorable than nonvivid information).
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mental mandate. Either self-interested or public-interested companies
might take steps in this direction. Such campaigns might involve vivid
accounts, by real people, of problems created by excessive borrowing.
To be especially effective, the accounts should involve brief, memora-
ble narratives of typical behavior that has led people to serious harm.
Second, government might engage in public education campaigns that
are specifically designed to alert people to the risks. Such public edu-
cation campaigns are likely to work best if they actually engage peo-
ple's emotions.3 A third and last possibility would involve a disclosure
mandate imposed on credit card companies themselves. Such compa-
nies might be required to provide vivid warnings of the risks of exces-
sive borrowing, perhaps accompanied by narratives of real lives that
have been adversely affected by it. This is the least plausible solution,
because the risks associated with borrowing have not been shown to be
sufficiently large to justify a compulsory warning program of this kind.
Would either of the first two steps be worthwhile? The question
cannot be answered in an empirical vacuum. Everything depends on
the magnitude of the problem and the effects of debiasing strategies in
reducing it. All that can be said is that on the basis of what is now
known, such strategies might well do some good and are most unlikely
to produce significant harm.
C. Default Rules
Libertarian paternalists are especially interested in the use of de-
fault rules to move behavior in welfare-promoting directions; the crea-
tive use of default rules is central to the project of libertarian paternal-
ism." Such rules can have exceptionally powerful effects on choices,
behavior, and outcomes." I have already referred to the effects of auto-
matic enrollment plans in increasing savings in the work place. Consider
a few other examples.
1. Insurance policies.
For insurance, a natural experiment demonstrated the potential
stickiness of default rules." Pennsylvania offered a default program for
43 See Loewenstein and O'Donoghue, 73 U Chi L Rev at 189 (cited in note 8).
44 See Sunstein and Thaler, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1201 (cited in note 21) (concluding that
policymakers should choose default rules that are likely to promote people's welfare).
45 See Ian Ayres, Menus Matter. 73 U Chi L Rev 3.4 (2006).
46 See Colin F Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field, in Kahne-
man and Tversky, eds, Choices, Values, and Frames 288, 294-95 (cited in note 7) (discussing the
endowment effect and its application to insurance options); Eric J. Johnson, et al, Framing, Prob-
ability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, in Kahneman and Tversky, eds, Choices, Values, and
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drivers containing a full right to sue and a relatively high premium;
purchasers could elect to switch to a new plan by "selling" the more
ample right to sue and paying a lower premium. By contrast, New Jer-
sey created a system in which the default plan included a relatively
low premium and no right to sue; purchasers were allowed to deviate
from the default program and to purchase the right to sue by choosing a
program with that right and also a higher premium. In both cases, the
default rule tended to stick. A strong majority accepted the default
rule in both states, with only about 20 percent of New Jersey drivers
acquiring the full right to sue, and 75 percent of Pennsylvanians re-
taining that right." There is no reason to think that there was a system-atic difference between the preferences of citizens of the two states.
2. Organ donation.
In the United States, those who want their organs to be available
for others must affirmatively say so, usually through an explicit nota-
tion on their driver's licenses. But in many other nations-Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Sin-
gapore, Slovenia, and Spain-people are presumed to consent to allow
their organs to be used, after death, for the benefit of others; they are
permitted to overcome the presumption, usually through an explicit
notation to that effect on their driver's licenses. Eric Johnson and
Daniel Goldstein find that with respect to organ donation, people lack
stable preferences and their decisions are very much influenced by the
default rule. 9 Similarly, a controlled online experiment showed a sub-
stantial effect from the default rule: the opt-in system created a 42
percent consent rate, about half of the 82 percent rate for an opt-out
system."
The real-world evidence is even more dramatic. Presumed con-
sent nations show consent rates ranging from a low of 85.9 percent
(Sweden) to a high of 100 percent (Austria), with a median of 99 per-
cent.5 ' The default also produces a significant, though less dramatic,
Frames 224, 238 (cited in note 7) (comparing the default options for insurance in Pennsylvania
and New Jersey).
47 ,Johnson, et al, Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, in Kahneman
and Tversky, eds, Choices, Values, and Frames at 238 (cited in note 46).
48 See http://www.presumedconsent.org/solutions.htm (visited Jan 2,2006).
49 See Johnson and Goldstein, 302 Science at 1338 (cited in note 30) (discussing three
studies analyzing the impact of default rules on people's preferences regarding organ donation).
50 Id.
51 Id.
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increase in actual donations, meaning that many lives are saved as a
result of the presumed consent system.
3. Vacation time.
A substantial effect from the legal default rule was found in an
experimental study of law student reactions to different state law pro-
visions governing vacation time from firms.3 The study involved two
conditions. In the first, state law guaranteed two weeks of vacation
time, and law students were asked to state their median willingness to
pay (in reduced salary) for two extra weeks of vacation. In the second
condition, state law provided a mandatory, nonwaivable two week
vacation guarantee, but it also provided employees (including associ-
ates at law firms) with the right to two additional weeks of vacation, a
right that could be "knowingly and voluntarily waived." Students were
asked how much employers would have to pay them to give up their
right to the two extra weeks. All by itself, the switch in the default rule
more than doubled the students' responses, raising the median amount
from $6,000 to $13,000.
There are several possible explanations of the effects of default
rules in these and other cases. Inertia undoubtedly plays a role." Ac-
tion is necessary to change a default rule, and inertia therefore favors
such rules. The default rule also conveys information by virtue of its
status as such.5 Perhaps the state, or an employer, has chosen a default
rule for a reason, and if so, people should stick with it unless they have
a reason of their own to depart. Finally, the default rule may create an
endowment effect,% leading people to favor the existing allocation of
entitlements; for that reason the rule will tend to stick.
How might these ideas be enlisted to reduce the risk of excessive
borrowing? Here is a simple inspiration for seriously investigating that
question: many people who are purchasing goods and services with
credit cards would do much better if they used debit cards instead.
With debit cards, they would avoid high interest rates and late fees.
For many consumers, the use of credit cards is a product of habit and
52 Johnson and Goldstein estimate that switching to an opt-out system increases organs
actually used by 16 percent, holding everything else constant. Id at 1339.
53 See Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule; 77 NYU L Rev 106,113-14 (2002).
54 See Madrian and Shea, 116 Q J Econ at 1149-50 (cited in note 22) (arguing that inertia
contributes to an employee's decision not to opt out of automatic enrollment in a 401(k) plan).
55 See id at 1182 (suggesting that many employees stick with the default contribution to a
401(k) plan because "employees view the default investment allocation under automatic enroll-
ment as implicit advice from the company on 'the best' allocation of one's retirement assets").
56 See generally Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw U L
Rev 1227, 1232-35 (2003) (discussing the causes and normative implications of endowment
effects created by default rules).
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inertia, rather than of any kind of reflective choice against the use of
debit cards. Significant charges result from simple procrastination. On
this view, a narrow question is how to ensure optimal decisions, in
terms of individual welfare, in the choice between credit cards and
debit cards. Fortunately, there is evidence that many consumers are
shifting from credit cards to debit cards,7 perhaps in order to avoid the
effects of their own bounded rationality. But it is reasonable to think
that the shifts have been occurring more rarely than they should if
consumer welfare is our goal.
Suppose that many people who are using credit cards would do
better using debit cards instead. If so, it would be valuable to make
debit cards a kind of default option, to be used unless borrowers spe-
cifically decide otherwise. Credit card companies might take, or be
encouraged to take, steps in this direction on their own. They might
say, for example, that unless consumers specifically say otherwise,
payments will be automatically deducted every month from a speci-
fied checking account. The "opt out" might be done at the time of ini-
tial application for the card; perhaps better, it might be required on an
annual, biannual, or monthly basis. Alternatively, regulators might en-
courage or require credit card companies to make automatic deduc-
tion an option for new credit card owners, saying that at the time of
initial acquisition of the card, consumers must be given the opportu-
nity to use automatic deduction, with a salient notation to this effect.
Somewhat more aggressively, regulators might require companies to
make automatic deduction the default option, subject to override ei-
ther at the point of purchase or on an annual, biannual, or even
monthly basis.
Here is another possibility. We have seen that with the Save More
Tomorrow plan, workers can be encouraged to produce significant
increases in savings rates." It is easy to imagine a parallel plan, "Bor-
row Less Tomorrow" (BLT).5 Private institutions could assist consum-
ers who have borrowed excessively by helping them to pay down their
debt, perhaps by encouraging them to enter into agreements to ensure
that the level of debt would be lower each month than it was before.
Credit card companies could themselves help certain customers in this
way-not by mandating participation, but by encouraging people to
participate if they choose. Perhaps governments could consider incen-
tives to lead the private sector to provide this kind of assistance. In
fact a BLT plan might be combined with the idea of automatic en-
57 See Brown and Plache, 73 U Chi L Rev at 84-85 (cited in note 19).
58 See Thaler and Benartzi, 112 J Polit Econ at S185 (cited in note 23) (noting that partici-
pants in the SMarT program almost quadrupled their saving rates).
59 I am grateful to Matthew Rabin for the acronym.
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rollment, ensuring that for expenditures above a specified limit, pay-
ments would come out of existing checking accounts, rather than be-
ing used to increase debt.
Whether any kind of weak paternalism makes sense in this con-
text cannot be decided in the abstract. It is necessary to know the
magnitude of the problem of excessive borrowing and the likely effec-
tiveness of any weakly paternalistic response. My own tentative judg-
ment is that an information campaign that encourages the use of
automatic payment from existing accounts would probably do some
good and little harm.
V. STRONG PATERNALISM
If boundedly rational borrowing is pervasive, and if consumer
choices are frequently impairing consumers' welfare, it is possible that
more intrusive government responses are desirable. Suppose that myo-
pia, procrastination, cumulative cost neglect, and excessive optimism
are leading many people to borrow money on behalf of purchases that
produce little short-term gain but significant long-term harm. If so,
prohibitions on voluntary agreements might be justified, at least if the
aggregate benefits exceed the aggregate costs. When such agreements
can be shown to injure the very people who enter into them, the firm
presumption against strong paternalism might be overcome; and
bounded rationality is often the source of the relevant injury.
In the context of the credit card market, there is an important
supplemental point. The very structure of that market appears to lead
many companies to appeal to bounded rationality, rather than to at-
tempt to counteract it. As with state lotteries, where advertising cam-
paigns appeal to unrealistic optimism and probability neglect, so too,
plausibly, for borrowing: some companies encourage people to obtain
cards with the hope that many of them will procrastinate and pay
significant late fees and interest charges.
We could imagine a continuum of responses. The most modest
would single out particular features of agreements that are peculiarly
likely to reflect bounded rationality, and to operate to harm consum-
ers ex post. A possible candidate is the "teaser rate," by which con-
sumers are given an opportunity to use credit cards at a low rate-
sometimes a zero interest rate-until the expiration of the introduc-
tory period. The teaser rate operates to tempt some consumers to be-
gin to use credit cards, apparently with insufficient awareness of the
60 See Bar-Gill, 98 Nw U L Rev at 1376 (cited in note 3) ("Interestingly, if the credit card
market is indeed as competitive as it appears to be, issuers have to exploit consumers' imperfect
rationality in order to survive in this market.").
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effects, over time, on their welfare. Many consumers who are excited
about teaser rates do not sufficiently appreciate the small size of the
actual gain. As Oren Bar-Gill explains, "The teaser strategy works. De-
spite the fact that most borrowing is done at the high post-promotion
rates, consumers appear to be extremely sensitive to teaser rates.
'I
Suppose that teaser rates can be shown to lead boundedly ra-
tional people to become credit card holders, in a way that produces
aggregate harm. If so, the argument for banning such rates may not
seem entirely implausible. Unfortunately, a ban would impose costs on
many borrowers, above all those who rationally opt for the teaser
rates (either because they will switch cards after the expiration of the
relevant period or because they are net gainers from the package they
receive). Indeed, a ban on teaser rates would be not only strongly pa-
ternalistic but also asymmetrical in an important and unattractive
sense: it would harm the sophisticated consumers who take advantage
of them. Here as elsewhere, weak paternalism should be the first line
of defense. But if a ban on teaser rates would protect people against
excessive borrowing while also imposing modest costs on those who
benefit from them, it might be worth considering. I do not, however,
believe that the argument for such a ban has been made out.
A far more aggressive approach would be to enact usury laws.
Such laws are price controls, and most of the time, the argument
against price controls is devastatingly powerful: they create scarcity
and typically harm the very people they are designed to help, by de-
priving them of access to a good that they want. In this context, an
obvious danger with price controls is that they will make it impossible
for (rational) people to obtain loans-perhaps injuring those people
who most need those loans, and who are in the worst position to ob-
tain needed resources through other routes. But the argument for
usury laws is strengthened by identifiable features of the credit card
market.6 It is exceptionally easy to obtain a credit card. Companies
make much of their money from high interest rates and late charges.
As Bar-Gill has explained, market pressures give companies a strong
incentive to take advantage of bounded rationality.6 In the abstract,
usury laws would appear to be a well-designed response. A ban on
interest rates above a certain level would counteract the tendency to
exploit bounded rationality by restructuring the system of pricing in
the direction of annual fees-precisely the structure that would plau-
61 Id at 1392.
62 See id at 1422-23 (arguing that consumer bias "opens the door to a serious reconsidera-
tion of usury in the credit card context").
63 Seeidat 1376.
[73:249
Boundedly Rational Borrowing
sibly emerge if myopia, cumulative cost neglect, and unrealistic opti-
mism were not involved.
On the other hand, usury restrictions would impose serious costs.
It is possible to imagine that many fully rational people benefit from a
situation in which annual rates are low and in which interest rates are
high. This is obviously so if they do not maintain debt and hence pay
no interest. Such people use credit cards essentially as debit cards;
they lose nothing by the current arrangement and benefit from the
existence of a kind of subsidy by card users who pay significant inter-
est and large late fees. To be sure, there is a serious problem with this
system, because it involves a perverse system of redistribution, from
less wealthy people who maintain debt to relatively wealthy people
who pay on time. But it is also the case that some people, some of the
time, are better off with low annual fees and high interest than with
higher fees and lower interest-at least if they have a reasonable ex-
pectation of growing income over time.
One question is the size of this population, and the extent to
which its members are behaving rationally rather than in a way that is
distorted by cognitive and motivational problems. This is an empirical
question that cannot be resolved by abstractions. But it is reasonable
to speculate that if usury laws provided a reallocation of consumer
costs toward higher annual fees, the principal beneficiaries would be
people who suffer from bounded rationality and hence from high con-
sumer debt. But there is a strong response to the argument for usury
laws: recent evidence suggests that there is intense competition over
interest rates in the credit card market." Because such competition has
been occurring, a governmental response does not appear to be neces-
sary or even desirable.
Another form of strong paternalism would target the particular
payment provisions that most harm those with bounded rationality,
such as late fees. It is plausible to think that such fees are incurred
precisely by those who most suffer from the problems catalogued
here, including procrastination, myopia, and excessive optimism. If this
is so, it might be worthwhile to consider restrictions on the magnitude
of late fees, at least if the consequence of such restrictions would be to
shift from fee payments to higher upfront charges. Such a shift would
have the desirable effect of ensuring that company practices would
not penalize those suffering most severely from bounded rationality.
64 See Brown and Plache, 73 U Chi L Rev at 79 (cited in note 19).
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CONCLUSION
Many people borrow excessively, whether excessiveness is meas-
ured ex ante or ex post. I have emphasized here the importance of the
ex post perspective, simply because the most serious problems arise
when borrowing behavior produces serious economic distress. A num-
ber of psychological mechanisms are likely to contribute to excessive
borrowing, including procrastination, myopia, cumulative cost neglect,
unrealistic optimism, and miswanting. These mechanisms help to illu-
minate many areas in which bounded rationality leads people to deci-
sions that impair their welfare. Hence an analysis of boundedly ra-
tional borrowing should apply to other contexts in which more serious
problems result from bounded rationality.
In exploring legal responses to problems of this sort, we should
distinguish between weak and strong paternalism. Here as elsewhere,
regulators ought to adopt a firm presumption in favor of weak pater-
nalism and freedom of choice. Unfortunately, informational ap-
proaches are unlikely to provide a great deal of help, simply because
they do not respond to bounded rationality. Debiasing is far more
promising; if government enlists salience and availability in the inter-
est of reducing excessive borrowing, it is unlikely to impose significant
costs and it might produce real gains. It seems clear that many people
who use credit cards would do better to use debit cards instead. One
possibility is that private and public institutions should alter existing
default rules so as to move closer to the preferred state of affairs.
Strong paternalism-in the form of restrictions on particular
practices or more general usury laws-is usually to be avoided, partly
because it is likely to introduce inefficiencies, and partly because it is
likely to hurt many of the people that it is intended to help. Notwith-
standing the peculiar nature of the credit card market, I do not believe
that existing evidence provides adequate grounds for strong paternal-
ism. Here, as elsewhere, it is best to begin, and probably to end, with
weak paternalism of the kind that I have outlined here.
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